Moral errors are unlikely to remain neatly compartmentalized.

Non-Aggression Principle

At the highest level of generality, justice requires giving others their due. Some libertarians have argued that giving others their due entails merely that each of us refrain from initiating physical force against other people, or defrauding them. The principle forbidding such conduct is called the “non-​aggression principle” or “NAP.” Some libertarians argue that it follows from the NAP that you can be a libertarian even if you are sexist or racist or otherwise bigoted, so long as you don’t express your bigotry by punching out, robbing, or defrauding the targets of your bigotry – in short, so long as you don’t violate the liberty rights of such people. According to these self-​described libertarians, all groups are not morally or intellectually equal, so there is no reason why they should treat members of such groups - even women and people of color! - with dignity.

These “brutalists,” as Jeffrey Tucker (2014) calls them, borrowing a term from architecture, are correct that bigotry is logically compatible with libertarianism – that is, there is no conceptual clash between bigotry and respecting the NAP. But as Tucker and others have pointed out, bigotry conflicts with the libertarian ideal of a society in which individuals flourish by pursuing their values peacefully, in association with others. Contempt or hatred for certain groups is contrary to such flourishing. To this I want to add another argument against bigotry: bigotry is psychologically and morally incompatible with respect for the NAP. Bigots are more likely to violate the rights of the individuals they are bigoted against than are non-​bigots. Hence a libertarian society with a lot of bigots is unlikely to remain libertarian very long.

What bigots ignore is that, in addition to following the NAP, giving others their due means judging individuals according to their deserts. A teacher who grades students’ tests arbitrarily does not treat them as they deserve, and thereby wrongs them. Similarly, racist homeowners who refuse to rent to people of color, and universities and firms who refuse to hire them or women in senior positions, because “everyone knows” that people of color can’t be trusted, and women are not fit for more responsible jobs, fail to treat those people as they deserve. They judge the character or abilities of people of color and women on grounds of their biology, instead of their individual character and actions.

The bigots might observe that the transactions are voluntary, so if women and people of color accept low-​level jobs without complaint, they must find them acceptable. Here the bigots are doubly wrong. First, they lack the insight to perceive that if members of marginalized groups fail to stand up for themselves, it’s either because they regard doing so as hopeless, or because they have internalized society’s judgment of them as inherently inferior. Second, blinded by their bigotry, bigots fail to notice the many who do stand up for themselves.1

The bigots also never help those too poor to help themselves on the grounds that all poverty is due to moral defects such as laziness or intemperance. These bigots commit the same injustice of judging poor people as a collective rather than as individuals. Instead of taking the trouble to find out why someone is poor, they simply dismiss all of them as lazy or intemperate.

None of these judgments or acts violates the non-​aggression principle. Yet it is easy to see that they are still unjust because they are failures to judge people as they deserve. They are also, obviously, devoid of kindness and generosity.

When the bigots are criticized for their uncaring and prejudiced attitudes towards the poor, or their racial or gender prejudice, they say that the non-​aggression principle doesn’t require them to be benevolent towards everyone, or to “pretend” that women or people of other races are their moral or intellectual equals. All that the NAP requires of them is to not initiate or threaten force against others, and not defraud them. It says nothing about the equal moral status of all people. Their special concern for people of their own class and race, they say, stems from a natural identification with them-​-​but no one can be expected to identify with everyone. They simply don’t understand what all the fuss is about!

How likely is it that people so prejudiced about people of color, or women, or the poor, so unaware of – or unmotivated by – the requirement of justice to judge them as they deserve, and so lacking in benevolence towards them, will reliably respect their fundamental rights to property and bodily autonomy, or the civil rights that protect people’s fundamental rights, such as the right to a fair trial? Our general beliefs about, and emotional dispositions towards, others, carry implicit value judgments, and affect our perceptions and interpretations of particular situations. So, for example, if a bigoted person comes home to find his apartment burgled, he is more likely to suspect the black janitor, even though a rudimentary investigation would show him that the only person who had the opportunity is the white property manager. If the cop who answers the burgled person’s call is herself bigoted, she is more likely to arrest the janitor without much, if any, investigation. If the prosecutor is bigoted, he is more likely to charge the janitor with the burglary. If the defense attorney is bigoted, he is less likely to be a strong defender of the janitor’s innocence, contrary to his professional obligations. And if the judge and jurors are bigoted, they are less likely to issue impartial judgments. These unjust actions not only violate the innocent janitor’s right to be judged as he deserves, but also his right not to be aggressed against.

Examples can be multiplied. As libertarians, bigots may be resolved not to defraud anyone. But what if honoring an agreement becomes really costly? That is a situation in which self-​deception can kick in to make a person “forget” or fudge the terms of the agreement. For example, when it comes time to pay his black female landscaper, a bigot is more likely to rationalize that he didn’t really agree to pay her $500 for the job, that they were just tossing numbers around, that they had settled on $300, and so on. In short, people are more likely to be dishonest with, and defraud, those they are bigoted against.

Again, suppose that the kid who stole a radio from a store is a 15-​year old Hispanic teenager who grew up in an impoverished and abusive home. A kind and generous judge will pay attention to these facts, make allowances for the young man’s upbringing, try to rescue him from his abusive home, and sentence him with a view to improving his character and life. By contrast, a bigoted judge is likely to see only the fact that the teenager committed a crime and dispose of him quickly by sentencing him to “the full extent of the law” – as an adult.

Treating people justly requires us to identify with them as human beings, as ends in themselves, rather than as resources for our use. It requires us to see others as individuals who care about their lives just as we care about our own, with the potential to lead a life worth living. The justice that consists of not aggressing against others needs the support of the justice that consists of judging people as they deserve. And both require the support of the virtues of honesty, kindness, and generosity - indeed, arguably, of all the virtues.

In short, respect for people’s rights cannot be isolated from the rest of our moral psychology. We cannot reliably respect the rights of those we are bigoted against just by resolving to respect them, while sacrificing our characters to bigotry and the vices of dishonesty, injustice, and cruelty.

1. J.S. Mill makes both arguments in response to those who want to keep women subordinated to men (1978/1859, Ch. 1).